Reports that Air China, China Eastern, and China Southern are collectively expecting 33 C919s this year — a more than doubling of the 15 aircraft they received in 2025. But context matters enormously here. COMAC's own track record: Year Target Actual 2023 — 2 2024 — ~13 2025 75 ? revised to 25 ~15–16 2026 28+ (COMAC) / 33 (airlines) ? Our analysis shows that COMAC has delivered a cumulative total of 32 C919s since the program began — meaning the 2026 airline target alone would require nearly matching the program's entire history in a single year. IBA Group independently forecasts just 25 for 2026, rising to 45 in 2027. The CFM Engine Dependency: The Critical Chokepoint Probably the single biggest structural vulnerability for this program is the LEAP-1C engine. In May 2025, the US Commerce Department suspended CFM LEAP-1C export licenses to COMAC as part of the broader trade war — a five-week embargo that demonstrated exactly how fragile C919 production is. The restrictions were lifted in July 2025 as trade tensions eased, but the lesson was stark: without CFM engines, the assembly line stops. China's indigenous alternative, the AECC CJ-1000A, exceeded expectations during 2025 flight testing but is unlikely to reach production readiness before 2030. "Exceeded expectations." should be qualified - the target is to match CFM56 levels of fuel burn. In the current tariff environment — with US-China trade tensions ratcheted up again — the engine supply question is the key risk variable for anyone modeling 2026 C919 deliveries. International Market: Structurally Locked Out EASA's executive director stated explicitly that certification is three to six years away — meaning 2028 at the earliest, and realistically 2030+. There is no FAA pathway at all. As of March 2026, not a single C919 has been delivered to a non-Chinese airline. The only nominally "international" order — 15 aircraft from GallopAir of Brunei — is a Chinese-investor-backed startup that has received nothing. We're not the only firm with awkward questions. Cirium projects C919 capturing roughly 25% of new single-aisle deliveries to Chinese operators through 2043, with Airbus at 45% and Boeing at 30%. That's the medium-term ceiling in its home market. The Demand-Fill Equation The tariff dynamic creates a perverse situation: Chinese airlines can't easily accept Boeing jets (125% retaliatory tariffs), China Eastern just ordered 101 more A320neos for delivery in 2028–2032, and C919 production can't ramp up fast enough to bridge the gap. The near-term Chinese capacity shortfall is real, and C919 fills only a fraction of it. For institutional analysts, the bottom line is that even the "optimistic" scenario — airlines actually receive their 33 aircraft — represents a production rate of roughly 2–3 per month. Airbus and Boeing each deliver that in three days. Bottom Line The current crunch facing the Duopoly is literally COMAC's fantasy. The Duopoly has a 12+ year backlog. COMAC could find a customer for every C919 it can push out the FAL. Were COMAC to be producing anything like its promise, the entire commercial aviation system would hum a little better, and the supply chain would experience a little less stress. But we're not there and won't be for a long time.