Many things have been said about the 737 MAX’s quality meltdown and its ripple effect on Boeing’s narrowbody workhorse and best seller. The mid-rear cabin door plug failure will have long-lasting consequences for the OEM and the MAX 9 operators, setting aside the medium-term fallout of the -7 and -10 variants' certification process. Yesterday, we noted feedback from MAX 9 operators outside was yet to be heard; today, we have some from Latin America. In Latin America, two operators are obliged to carry the weight of the crisis: Panamanian COPA and Mexican Aeromexico. Both companies are 737-9 early adopters in the region, taking advantage of its extended capabilities. They are now facing a dilemma: besides the inconvenience of a partially grounded fleet, the MAX 9 is instrumental for them to compete in some of their most profitable routes. COPA grounded 21 of its 29 737-9 aircraft, a decision that hit 32 of the carrier's 80 destinations: US markets like Washington, Los Angeles, New York, Miami, and San Francisco, and the biggest Latin American cities like Buenos Aires, Bogota, Sao Paulo, and Santiago de Chile. The MAX 9 fleet represents almost a quarter of COPA’s network (24.1% of flights) but 40% of its ASK: a revenue hit that the company won’t find easy to compensate. Its 737-800 fleet reaches many destinations, but with an outdated and far less comfortable product, especially in its Business Class, as -9’s Dreams cabin is a remarkable offer for a very important segment. “Copa Airlines deeply regrets the flight cancellations and delays resulting from this situation, beyond its control, and wishes to state that its entire team is working tirelessly to mitigate these disruptions to the best of its ability while expressing its sincerest apologies to its passengers for the inconvenience caused," said the company in a polite release. Internally, voices are angrier. Aeromexico For Aeromexico, the panorama is not much different, as after Mexico regained ICAO’s Category 1, the 737-9 stepped into US routes with better overall product offerings to compete with major carriers. Aeromexico faces a dilemma on its own as it can’t compete with Mexican LCCs in fares and also can’t compete with US legacy carriers in service. The MAX gave it an edge, but it is now gone. As the MAX 9 crisis dust settles, carriers need to revise contingency plans to cover for situations like the one they are dealing with now: perhaps it is time to diversify fleet plans, losing the perks of a simplified support chain to gain some reliability by overlapping. Revenue and finance departments may need to include a provision for aircraft to be massively grounded. This applies to MAX and GTF-powered Airbus. The one-type solution sold as magical is, apparently, partly mythical.