Commercial Aviation’s Great Holding Pattern

Contemplating a description for the state of commercial aviation in 2025, I have settled on “The Great Holding Pattern.” There are several reasons why I chose that particular phrase. The primary reason is the number of delays we see daily in the industry. Having something happen on time and on budget, which was formerly routine, now seems rare. Almost everything is now delayed. Let’s look at some of the delays and their causes: OEMs are unable to meet their commitments Airlines are now accustomed to delays in the delivery of new aircraft. The OEMs cited supply chain constraints after the pandemic, but that was five years ago, in 2020. However, constraints persist, with Airbus stating that supply chain constraints will impact the company through 2027. Boeing, on the other hand, is limited by regulators after delivering the flawed 737 MAX, having previously defrauded the FAA (which Boeing had agreed to in a proposed lawsuit settlement) regarding a single point of failure on the aircraft. With firm caps on 737 MAX production levels, Boeing hasn’t required its supply chain to rebound as quickly as Airbus from the pandemic; however, it is entering a period in which it will need to ramp up production. The problem is lead times, as nobody knows when they might actually occur. Boeing has reached its regulatory maximum production of 38 MAX aircraft per month and expects to increase that rate in steps to 42, 47, 52, and 57 aircraft per month if it can maintain high scores on six key performance indicators agreed upon with the FAA. Engines have become a problem for Airbus, which has several A320 family aircraft grounded due to issues with the Pratt & Whitney GTF engines. These problems have resulted in heavy maintenance, including the premature tear-down and reassembly of engines with modified parts. While the results have been successful, many operators have been without their aircraft for several months while the maintenance is performed. There are not enough spare engines to support the fleet with engine swaps. The GTF issues are now being transferred to other aircraft, including the Airbus A220 and Embraer E2 jets, which also utilize the P&W engine. However, that doesn’t mean their competitor, CFM, gets off scot-free. The CFM Leap has also had teething problems, which, while minor when compared to the GTF, have still caused serious issues for airline customers and delayed deliveries from Airbus. The delays aren’t just narrow-body aircraft related, either. Boeing has had serious issues with the 787 program, in which fuselage sections did not meet tolerances and required repairs, necessitating Boeing to build inventory as aircraft underwent rework. This effort took more than a year to resolve, further tarnishing the saga of the Dreamliner. Supply chain constraints for business-class seats and obtaining FAA certification for those seats have led to additional delivery delays for Lufthansa, whose choice of seats remains mired in the certification process. Airbus has been similarly impacted, with late deliveries of aircraft toilets for the A350XWB resulting in delays for this wide-body aircraft, coming on top of engine issues with the Rolls-Royce Trent XWB engine, which have led to Airworthiness Directives due to durability concerns. While those issues have been addressed, periodic inspections are now required for fuel hoses under the latest regulatory actions from earlier this year, which have impacted airline schedules. The Great Holding Pattern includes waiting for aircraft and engines. Delays in Certification of New Aircraft Boeing has three new aircraft well into the certification process with the FAA. Boeing expects the 737 MAX 7 to be certified later this year, the 737 MAX 10 early next year, and the 777X in mid-to-late 2026. Each of these three programs is well behind schedule, by five years or more. A significant element in the delays results from the FAA's lack of trust in Boeing, which was “burned” by the company during the certification of the 737 MAX 8 and MAX 9. The FAA relied on Boeing engineers to be truthful but found the opposite to be true when the aircraft, equipped with the MCAS system that Boeing engineers had classified as minor, turned into a major problem that resulted in a self-crashing airplane when activated. The FAA now has Boeing on a short leash and is digging into the details during its certification process. The “737 MAX TAX” on the certification process is being felt across the industry, as even Gulfstream was delayed six months in certifying the G700 business jet. Like Boeing, Gulfstream needs FAA Approval, but unlike Boeing, it has a strong and supportive relationship of trust with the FAA. However, even Gulfstream was delayed, as new certification processes in the wake of the 737 MAX debacle have resulted in more stringent requirements and increased workload for OEM engineers and FAA personnel. Winning back the trust of the FAA is a challenge for Boeing, which has burned many bridges with its regulatory body. The 737 MAX 7 and MAX 10 each require a certification exemption to current rules to obtain certification, with the option being another long delay to redesign the stall management yaw damper, or SMYD. The FAA has not yet ruled on the exemption, which was requested in February 2025. Concurrently, the 777X is also mired in a lengthy certification process and will likely have more flight hours recorded before certification than any other airliner, as the FAA is not accepting some of the earlier Boeing test flights for the certification process, requiring re-demonstration of compliance with requirements. Boeing’s fraudulent actions during the 737 MAX certification have created a new level of more stringent requirements and a trust-but-verify rather than a trusted relationship with Boeing. Unfortunately, these new requirements impact the timing and scope of certification efforts for everyone in the industry, not just Boeing. The Great Holding Pattern has customers waiting years for their new models that are awaiting certification five years longer than expected. Delays in New Product Development The global pandemic set the industry back as travel demand came to a grinding halt, resulting in order deferrals by airlines who were unable to take delivery of new aircraft. OEMs have failed to ramp up production levels to offset the decline in profitability of their programs, and have pushed out replacement programs to the right. The A320neo and 737 MAX were interim airplanes until the next generation of technologies emerged in the early 2030s, providing new clean-sheet designs. New aircraft programs are now projected in the 2035-2040 time frame, as next-generation propulsion systems and technologies have also been delayed. Traditionally, propulsion technology has driven aircraft programs, as engines with both fuel and sustainability benefits are required to improve aircraft performance. The major players are exploring various alternatives for the next generation, with Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce focusing on geared engines, while CFM is concentrating on the RISE open rotor technology. While expectations for new technology engines were once for the 2030 time frame a decade ago, it now appears that 2035 is a more realistic timeline. Despite the significant impacts of climate change now being quite observable in weather changes, the focus on sustainability, particularly in the United States, has not yet achieved critical mass for action. Fortunately, a few entrepreneurs are exploring blended wing body aircraft that could provide a 20% reduction in fuel burn and sustainability benefits through aerodynamic improvements. The major players have also evaluated BWB designs and understand the difficulties in introducing and certifying significant deviations from the norm, particularly engine placement for snow or ice ingestion and water-ditching issues with BWB designs. But a 20% fuel burn improvement over tube and wing designs is meaningful and necessary for the industry. Certification issues can and will be solved with creative solutions; the question is when, rather than if. New middle-of-the-market aircraft in the 200-250 seats range will serve a market need for both long-haul domestic and international flights, while providing new cabin flexibility for airlines that need to differentiate themselves in the marketplace. The current focus on premium cabins can be enhanced in BWB designs that offer opportunities for unique passenger accommodations, given the extended cabin width. While all of this is well and good, entry into service of a new aircraft is likely to be in the mid-2030s at the earliest, particularly if new entrants are involved. However, they will need to establish global service and support networks, along with the required infrastructure, a substantial task to accomplish quickly. The Great Holding Pattern means that the existing players have pushed the schedule for new aircraft further to the right. Air Traffic Control Delays The aging air traffic control system in the United States is causing delays at major airports, with Newark Airport serving as a notable example. United was forced to make significant flight reductions at its Newark hub due to aging systems and the inability to adequately staff the facilities with the necessary experience for navigating the world’s most congested airspace around New York City. This isn’t an easy fix and will likely require a decade before new systems, new procedures, and trained staff can come together to solve the current problems. The Great Holding Pattern means that aircraft will enter real holding patterns with ATC delays. New systems are neither quick to develop nor implement. The last upgrade of Air Traffic Control systems took more than a decade. The key question is whether we will be forced to wait that long, or a more rapid project can leverage new technologies and known flight plans and weather to smooth traffic flows and enable better on-time performance. The Great Holding Pattern will need massive infrastructure investment and outside the box thinking to move to a more coordinated environment between aircraft and ATC. A lack of Common Sense is delaying the New Technology Regional Jets Embraer has placed its E175-E2 model on hold because it exceeds a weight clause in the contract between pilot unions and major US airlines. With around 40% of flights in the US market operated by regional jets, it is the key market accounting for those aircraft. Without the US market, regional jet programs cannot be economically successful. The unions rightly want their pilots to fly larger aircraft and to restrict the number of regional jets. That is understandable and well and good. However, not adjusting the arbitrary weight limit for the next generation of fuel-efficient engines, which are heavier but deliver a 15-20% improvement in fuel efficiency, is detrimental to global sustainability. It would be easy for the unions to restrict the same number of aircraft with the same seating levels, but increase their weight restrictions to enable new technologies to enter the market. However, with a pilot shortage, they were in a position to dictate contract terms. However, forcing airlines to continue using older aircraft, and the last remaining player in the market, Embraer, to sell a design that entered service 20 years ago rather than a more efficient re-engined model, the unions are putting their future at risk. The self-serving pilot unions need to wake up and smell the coffee. The Great Holding Pattern means that certain groups are hanging onto adversarial positions rather than compromising for the benefits of all parties, including sustainability. When Will SAF Become the Answer? The aviation industry is counting on Sustainable Aviation Fuel to be the answer to sustainability, aiming to reach a 50% reduction in carbon emissions by 2035 and 100% by 2050. But that is also changing, as the industry recognizes that it will be unable to meet the 50% requirement by 2035 because SAF isn’t easy to produce, and requires either agricultural or waste feedstocks. Are you hearing about SAF refineries being built or feedstock companies ready to support production? The answer is not enough, because we are not technically or financially prepared to switch to this more expensive, but greener fuel. While SAF may be the answer, the Great Holding Pattern shows the SAF timeline pushing to the right. While modifying engines to accept SAF is occurring, the quantity of SAF available, particularly since the market will nearly double the fleet by 2044, means tremendous capital investment will be needed to eliminate the SAF bottleneck. Today, SAF accounts for 0.7% of the $254 billion jet fuel market. If total SAF production doubled every two years, we would not reach 10% SAF penetration for another 7.5 years. Clearly, we aren't going to reach the growth rates necessary to meet the industry targets without major investments and governmental support.. Without cost reductions for SAF, which is currently 2-3 times the cost of conventional fuel, will inflation impacts for airfares negatively impact the projected traffic growth rates we see in forecasts from Airbus and Boeing? The Great Holding Pattern is waiting for creative government-industry solutions amidst vastly different sustainability priorities in Europe and the United States. Economic Uncertainty isn’t Helping with Financial Investment There is a litany of issues impacting the aerospace supply chain that are resulting in a lack of capital investment. Boeing’s Partnering for Success program, followed by the MAX groundings and the global pandemic, resulted in significant financial losses for many Boeing suppliers. Some of these suppliers decided not to reinvest in the business without better margins and a more stable future outlook. Add a dash of uncertainty regarding tariffs and the impacts of imported raw materials on profitability, and suppliers are skittish about investing for the future and increasing capacity. Add the lead time for building a new facility and the volatility in tariff policies from TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out). Trump tariffs impacts suppliers, and their capacity isn’t growing fast enough to support OEM requirements. The supply-demand balance has lost its stability following Boeing’s meltdown and the global pandemic, and rather than returning to normality, appears to be setting a new normal of shortages and potential delays. The one certainty is a continuing 7-year backlog for OEMs, which they seem unable to reduce. The Great Holding Pattern and long backlogs have introduced FOMO, fear of missing out, into the equation as airlines and lessors compete for early delivery positions. The Bottom Line So where does all of this lead? The answer is that the Great Holding Pattern means few industry participants will be able to meet their commitments, and it appears unlikely that these problem will be solved in the near term. The new normal is being late with everything and having customers deal with the ensuing problems. Short to intermediate term, it is viable. Long-term, however, it is unsustainable. We are now approaching the crossover point between those alternatives. Emirates expected its 777-9s four years ago, but can’t do anything about it, since there are no aircraft alternatives of similar size. SkyWest would have loved a new technology regional jet from Embraer, but has been forced to reorder essentially the same 20-year-old design with only modest benefits over its existing fleet. And the list goes on and on. There are now simply too few choices with the duopoly, who have relied on derivatives for too long in the narrow-body market. A lack of new technology alternatives is a result of the Great Holding Pattern. The industry has been in the Great Holding Pattern since the pandemic. Breaking out of the malaise will require innovative new ideas coming from new players who can make a difference in terms of efficiency and sustainability. We don’t foresee Airbus, Boeing, or Embraer leading that charge until the middle of the next decade.

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