CFM56 parts
The awful story about AOG Technics continues to reverberate. The fact that a criminal forged more than 60,000 authenticity certificates for engine components on his home computer between 2019 and 2023, while operating from his garage, should be attracting much more attention.
His timing was perfect. The global supply chain was far behind demand. Buyers were greedy, looking for cheaper parts. Yes, he’s a bad guy, and he’s been punished. Now go after the buyers who should have known better. Unlike this guy, they’re insiders. They should know better. But crickets because we have a fall guy. This story shouldn’t make you feel safer.
Look at the period: 2019-2023. That was the pandemic peak. It was a difficult time, but it was not the first time commercial aviation as a whole, and airlines specifically, had been hit by a Black Swan event. The industry operates on zero risk basis when it comes to hardware. Or so you thought.
Shared Blame
Focusing solely on the UK company selling $9.3M in unapproved CFM56 engine parts overlooks the shared responsibility of buyers in the aviation supply chain, who failed to perform basic due diligence. These buyers, typically maintenance organizations or operators, had access to supplier databases and industry alerts but prioritized cost savings over verification.
Incident Overview
A UK-based firm, identified in FAA and EASA enforcement actions around 2023-2024, supplied counterfeit or unapproved CFM56 turbine engine components—critical for Boeing 737 and Airbus A320—to global MROs (maintenance, repair, and overhaul providers). The parts, valued at approximately $9.3 million, lacked proper FAA Form 8130-3 certification or traceability, violating airworthiness standards. Regulators highlighted how the seller exploited gaps in digital parts marketplaces, but the real risk emerged post-sale when installed parts could compromise flight safety.
Buyer Responsibilities Neglected
Buyers should have flagged the supplier as “new and unknown” through routine checks via the FAA’s Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA) list, EASA’s Part-21 database, or ILSA (International Logistics Supportability Assessment). Industry protocols under AS9100 quality standards mandate verifying supplier history, including prior approvals and audit trails—steps skipped here in favor of cheaper alternatives. Multiple recipients, including North American and European firms, installed these parts without secondary sourcing validation, thereby amplifying the scandal beyond a single seller.
Broader Supply Chain Implications
This case underscores systemic flaws where downstream buyers bear equal blame under FAA Advisory Circular 20-62E, which requires “know your supplier” scrutiny. For the aviation silo, it highlights KPI gaps in supplier risk scoring—new vendors should trigger enhanced audits, not blind acceptance. Emphasizing buyer accountability could drive better data analytics in procurement, reducing counterfeit infiltration estimated at 5-10% of the $20B+ aftermarket.
Why is only one man going to jail? Buyers include American Airlines, Ryanair, Ethiopian Airlines, and Aero Norway. It was a TAP Air Portugal engineer who asked for proof of a part’s origin, and the CFM said the associated documents were fake.
The good guys? CFM for making an engine that can be abused and still function. CFM has tightened up the process a lot. The TAP Air Portugal engineer for discovery.
The heroes? CFM for making an engine that can be abused and still function. And that TAP Air Portugal engineer.
The rougues? The list is long. Far too long.
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