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Insight: Friday 2 August 2019 – Boeing Redesigns MAX Flight Control System

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News

New broke in the Seattle Times regarding a redesign of the flight control system for the Boeing 737 MAX, following additional FAA testing.  In June, the FAA uncovered a potential flaw in the 737 MAX flight control system that resulted in a fundamental software design change for the aircraft.

The automated flight control system on the MAX will now be modified to take input from both flight control computers at once, instead of the current use of one on each flight.  Currently, the computers switch from one to the other on each flight.  The FAA specifically rejected Boeing’s assumption that pilots could be relied upon as the backstop safeguard in scenarios such as the un-commanded movement of the horizontal tail in the Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes.

Analysis

Boeing’s flight control system has relied on alternating single computer systems since the introduction of the 737-300 in 1982, and operates the same way on the 737NG.  The major difference is that the MAX has the MCAS system, while the older aircraft do not.Changing the architecture of the flight control system is a major undertaking, and will require switching to a “fail-safe” two-channel system.  A potential problem with a single microprocessor will be negated by the two-channel system, which would ensure a return to manual mode in the event of a problem with the computer system.

News broke in the Seattle Times regarding a redesign of the flight control system for the Boeing 737 MAX, following additional FAA testing.  In June, the FAA uncovered a potential flaw in the 737 MAX flight control system that resulted in a fundamental software design change for the aircraft.

The automated flight control system on the MAX will now be modified to take input from both flight control computers at once, instead of the current use of one on each flight.  Currently, the computers switch from one to the other on each flight.  The FAA specifically rejected Boeing’s assumption that pilots could be relied upon as the backstop safeguard in scenarios such as the un-commanded movement of the horizontal tail in the Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes.


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