CFM LEAP and GEnx also affected by powder metal contamination

Not just Pratt & Whitney, but GE Aerospace and CFM too have been confronted with a contamination issue in powder metal that requires the replacement of engine parts. In the case of GE and CFM, the issue affects the GEnx large turbofan and the CFM LEAP. For both engines, Service Bulletins and Airworthiness Directives have been issued since June 2022. CFM LEAP and GEnx also affected by powder metal contamination. Safran CEO Olivier Andriès confirmed the issue on the LEAP during today’s HY1 earnings call when he was asked to comment on the powder metal contamination problem with high-pressure turbine disks in the P&W Geared Turbofan. “I simply do not know what their (P&W) issue is and cannot comment specifically. What I can say is that on the CFM side, we detected in Summer 2021 a quality issue while inspecting rotating parts. We have completed the root-cause investigation at the time. This was resulting from the contamination of powder metal at one supplier facility for a limited number of batches.” Andriès continued: “We have taken all corrective actions and have proactively communicated to our customers and issued a Service Bulletin. We have planned and we are implementing a staggered removal program in the course of the shop visit cycles. There has been no engine failure and there has been no customer disruption and the financial impact is fully included in our guidance.” A GE Aerospace spokesperson adds that this is not a new issue. The company has been working with regulators FAA and EASA and with airline customers since the summer of 2021 on the problem. Service Bulletins have been issued since October 2021 and plans are in place for the next several years on planned engine removals and repairs. Whereas RTX sources the powder metal from within its own company, GE says that it is externally sourced. First AD in June 2022 The FAA and EASA Airworthiness Directives database shows that the issue of contaminated powder metal in the CFM LEAP first showed up in June 2022. The regulators issued an AD on June 17 of that year to address iron inclusion, after it was detected in three HPT rotor disks from different engine types of the LEAP-1A on the Airbus A320neo family. The AD specified the issue a “compressor Rotor Stages 6-10 Spools and High-Pressure Turbine (HPT) Rotor Stage 1 Disks.” “It has been determined that the affected parts identified in the Service Bulletin were manufactured using the same processes, and may also have reduced mechanical properties due to iron inclusion. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to failure of affected parts, possibly resulting in high energy debris release, with consequent damage to, and reduced control of, the aeroplane.” A second AD released on May 26 this year also covers the LEAP-1A. It covers “forward outer seals, high-pressure compressor (HPC) Stage 6-10 spools (compressor rotor stages 6-10 spools) and high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor stage 1 disks (HPT stage 1 disks), having a part number (P/N) and s/n as listed in the SB tables.” The AD set compliance time no later than 50 engine cycles after the effective date of this AD. Airworthiness Directives have been issued for both the LEAP-1A on the Airbus A320neo family and the -1B on the Boeing MAX (picture). (Richard Schuurman) On July 1, the FAA and EASA issued a third AD that covers iron inclusion, this time for the LEAP-1B on the Boeing MAX. Affected parts are the “high-pressure compressor (HPC) Stage 6-10 spools and high-pressure turbine (HPT) Stage 1 Disks, having a part number (P/N) and s/n as listed in Tables 1 to 3 (inclusive) of the SB.” The FAA AD says: “The FAA was notified by the manufacturer of the detection of iron inclusion in three non-LEAP–1B HPT rotor disks. Further investigation by the manufacturer determined that the iron inclusion is attributed to deficiencies in the manufacturing process. The investigation by the manufacturer also determined that certain LEAP–1B HPT stage 1 disks and a certain compressor rotor stages 6–10 spool manufactured using the same process may have reduced material properties and a lower fatigue life capability due to iron inclusion, which may cause premature fracture and subsequent uncontained failure of certain HPT stage 1 disks and a certain compressor rotor stages 6–10 spool. This condition, if not addressed, could result in uncontained debris release, damage to the engine, and damage to the aircraft.” The FAA AD on the LEAP-1B is still open for comment until September 7. The agency estimates that the work requires no more than eight hours per part. First indication in January 2022 A first indication of the problem might have been discovered in January 2022, when the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making after “the detection of melt-related freckles in the billet, which may reduce the life of certain compressor rotor stages 6-10 spools, HPT rotor interstage seals, HPT rotor stage 2 disks, LPT stage 1 disks, LPT stage 2 disks, LPT stage 3 disks, and LPT stage 4 disks (life-limited parts (LLPs)). Through the manufacturer's investigation, it was determined that these LLPs may have subsurface anomalies that developed during the manufacturing process, resulting in a lower life capability.” These subsurface anomalies might have been an indication that a flawed material had been used. Iron inclusion has also been detected on specific GEnx-1A and -1B engines. This is a -1A on a Boeing 787-9. (Richard Schuurman) GEnx also affected The iron inclusion problem is not limited to the LEAP. Also in June 2022, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for suspected iron inclusion in “certain low-pressure turbine rotor (LPTR) stage 4 disks and LPTR stage 6 disks” on the GEnx-2B/67-P engine that powers the Boeing 747-8. “Reduced material properties may cause premature LPTR stage 4 disk and LPTR stage 6 disk fracture, which could result in uncontained debris release. As a result of its investigation, the manufacturer published service information that specifies procedures for the removal and replacement of certain LPTR stage 4 disks and LPTR stage 6 disks installed on GEnx-2B67/P model turbofan engines. This condition, if not addressed, could result in uncontained debris release, damage to the engine, and damage to the airplane.” The NPRM became an AD on October 25. The FAA estimated the replacement of the affected parts to require some 500 working hours per engine. This was followed by another AD on December 22 for the GEnx-2B and -1B on the Boeing 787 for “certain HPT stage 2 disks, forward seals, and stages 6-10 compressor rotor spools.” The AD has become effective on January 26 this year but requires only eight working hours per part. Like on the LEAP, there might have been indications of the problem as early as December 2020, when the FAA adopted an AD for the GEnx after the detection of subsurface anomalies on the HPT stage 2 disks.

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