Insight Monday 22 June 2020 – MAX Whistleblower Identifies Additional Issues with MAX |

News: Last Thursday, the Seattle Times published a story outlining key points from a letter from a Boeing whistleblower to the US Senate prior to the hearings that week. In that letter, Curtis Ewbank, a Boeing engineer who worked on the MAX, resigned in 2015 when his concerns were dismissed (he later rejoined the company in 2018) outlined why he alleges that the MAX remains unsafe without the “synthetic airspeed” system utilized in all other Boeing products and changes to other systems grandfathered from the initial 1960s certification by the FAA that are now outdated and do not meet today’s standards. The original 737-100, on which the certification of the MAX is based, first entered service 53 years ago in 1967. There have been a number of changes to regulations since then, but since the MAX is considered a derivative aircraft by the FAA, systems that are not changed are often provided an exemption from newer regulations by the agency. Mr. Ewbank, in his allegations, indicated that in 2014 during the development of the MAX he worked unsuccessfully to have Boeing upgrade the flight control system with a new data measurement system called Synthetic Airspeed that would serve as a check on multiple sensors. Had it been implemented, he believes it may have prevented the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines' fatal crashes. He filed an ethics complaint with Boeing, first reported on last year, that alleges that Boeing rejected his safety upgrades because management focused on cost and schedule considerations and that anything that would require additional pilot training was off the table. He also alleged that Boeing lobbied the FAA to ignore certification requirement with respect to cockpit systems for alerting pilots of in-flight issues. Analysis: The allegations made by Ewbank square with some of the issues that emerged from the release of internal Boeing e-mails. In those e-mails, employees spoke about “inadvertently misleading the FAA” and were critical of the design of the 737 MAXs flight control and other systems. It became quite clear after the crashes that the MCAS system on the 737MAX was apparently not well tested, as it did not perform as it was expected when faulty sensors had it kick-in, resulting in two fatal crashes killing 346 people. The number and intensity of warning messages on today’s airliners can be daunting, and difficult for pilots to determine the initial error that caused the cascade of warning messages. But the allegations of the whistleblower, who was interviewed by the FBI in conjunction with their investigation, go far beyond the flight control systems. “The 737 MAX’s original certification was accomplished with hand-waving and deception to hide the numerous ways the 1960s-era design of the 737 does not meet current regulatory standards,” he alleges. Insight: Boeing has a system called Synthetic Airspeed on all of its airplanes except for the 737 series, which was designed in the 1960s before computer technology was light enough and powerful enough for today’s more sophisticated on-board systems. Boeing, in its sales contracts with airlines, promised that the MAX would not require additional training for pilots, and with at least one carrier, Southwest, established a $1 million penalty clause. Had Synthetic Airspeed been incorporated into the MAX, additional pilot training would be likely, and too costly given the contractual negotiations of Boeing’s marketing team. In addition, the deployment of Synthetic Airspeed would have likely taken additional time in bringing the MAX to market, which was unacceptable since Airbus had a substantial lead on Boeing with its A320neo model. While Boeing had business reasons to speed up the development of the MAX, the company erred with a flawed execution of MCAS. That flaw and the lack of updated systems for notifications to pilots of errors or failed sensors contributed to the two fatal crashes. Normally, we find allegations from whistleblowers often need to be taken with a grain of salt, given the potential for disgruntled employees wanting revenge on their former employer. In this case, however, the facts of the two crashes tend to align with his allegations, indicating credibility. We cannot but wonder about the discussions of this whistleblower with the FBI, and what might come next as investigations continue.

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