Clicky

Insight: Monday 29 July 2019 – Another Issue for MAX?

In a hard hitting story this weekend, the New York Times reported that F.A.A. delegation of decision authority to Boeing resulted in the 737 MAX “not meeting” agency guidelines “for protecting flight controls.” Should the international regulators undertaking an independent review of the MAX certification determine that a deficiency exists, the 737 MAX could be grounded for a substantial additional period while that issue is addressed.

After a change in regulatory processes in 2009, the F.A.A. delegated increased authority for approval of safety assessments to Boeing. Some of those assessments, such as for MCAS and, apparently, protection of flight controls, would likely not have been approved had F.A.A. engineers been in charge of the decision process. A flaw in the regulatory oversight process has led to the situation today, with an unsafe aircraft requiring retrofits and modifications.

Care to share?

News

In a hard hitting story this weekend, the New York Times reported that F.A.A. delegation of decision authority to Boeing resulted in the 737 MAX “not meeting” agency guidelines “for protecting flight controls.”  Should the international regulators undertaking an independent review of the MAX certification determine that a deficiency exists, the 737 MAX could be grounded for a substantial additional period while that issue is addressed.

After a change in regulatory processes in 2009, the F.A.A. delegated increased authority for approval of safety assessments to Boeing.   Some of those assessments, such as for MCAS and, apparently, protection of flight controls, would likely not have been approved had F.A.A. engineers been in charge of the decision process.  A flaw in the regulatory oversight process has led to the situation today, with an unsafe aircraft requiring retrofits and modifications.

Analysis

The flight control protection issues results from the larger engines being closer to the fuselage of the aircraft than on the 737NG.  The potential exists that an un-contained engine failure, like the one that happened April 17, 2018 on a Southwest 737-700, could occur on a MAX and sever the single control cable to the rudder.  According to the New York Times, the F.A.A. suggested two potential solutions, a second set of cables or a computerized system (fly by wire) to control the rudder, but Boeing

didn’t want to make these changes, as it was concerned about cost and schedule.  This, like MCAS, was another regulatory oversight that resulted in a compromise of safety.

In a hard-hitting story this weekend, the New York Times reported that F.A.A. delegation of decision authority to Boeing resulted in the 737 MAX “not meeting” agency guidelines “for protecting flight controls.”  Should the international regulators undertaking an independent review of the MAX certification determine that a deficiency exists, the 737 MAX could be grounded for a substantial additional period while that issue is addressed.

After a change in regulatory processes in 2009, the F.A.A. delegated increased authority for approval of safety assessments to Boeing.   Some of those assessments, such as for MCAS and, apparently, protection of flight controls, would likely not have been approved had F.A.A. engineers been in charge of the decision process.  A flaw in the regulatory oversight process has led to the situation today, with an unsafe aircraft requiring retrofits and modifications.


Subscriber content – Sign in

[maxbutton id=”1″ ]  [maxbutton id=”2″ ] [maxbutton id=”4″ ]