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David Calhoun, Boeing’s President, and CEO, made the following statements at the firm’s latest Investors Conference.
“We won’t contemplate a new airplane; we won’t even put it on the drawing board until we know we’re capable of doing that,” said Calhoun. “So this is strategy for us. Capabilities. And then there’ll be a moment in time where we’ll pull the rabbit out of the hat and introduce a new airplane sometime in the middle of next decade.”
He added: “What matters is the capability you bring to that airplane. Is it differentiable enough to put you in the leadership position?” said Calhoun. “I don’t want to fill a gap in a product line; I want to build a product that’s going to differentiate in a way that absolutely substitutes the airplanes that came before it.”
These statements are very important and send a signal that needs pondering. They are pregnant with meaning.
Regular readers know we have been pointing to the single-aisle middle of the market (MoM) for over a year. For an excellent review of the situation at Boeing, we recommend this analysis from our friends at TAC.
Boeing’s decision to roll the dice with the MAX carries risk. Not going for a new aircraft in the hottest commercial aviation segment is odd. Boeing was late responding to the A321neo – the MAX9 doesn’t compete effectively. The MAX10 might, but it has yet to be certified. Meanwhile, to get an idea of the timeline scale, the A321neo entered service in early 2017. Airbus has a crucial five-year head start.
Moreover, Airbus has continually improved the A321 since its launch 30 years ago: MTOW is up 20%, and its range has doubled. The A321 used to be ~25% of Airbus single-aisle orders and now represents ~33%. As the chart below illustrates, for 2022, the MoM segment of the single-aisle market is at 32%.
Currently, ch-Aviation’s fleet database shows over 779 A321neos in service. At Boeing’s Renton production rate of 30 per month, the A321neo fleet represents 26 months of production. To say Airbus has a substantial advantage is an understatement. Calhoun’s statements essentially have given Airbus a monopoly in a lucrative market.
The implications of the decision have alarm bells ringing. Airbus and Boeing compete vigorously for every order. Essentially conceding a high-demand segment to Airbus allows Airbus to deploy transfer pricing more aggressively. For example, if an order is being considered for single-aisle aircraft, Airbus and Boeing will offer various combinations of their models.
In pricing a deal, Airbus will use its A321 monopoly position and cut its profit margin on that model to support any other model to make the deal winnable. This has already happened at JetBlue and Qantas. Facing no A321neo competitor, Airbus has been given an “open season.” This makes competitive deals harder for Boeing, as they must cut their margins razor-thin to win. Boeing will walk away from deals that make no economic sense. Airbus has more financial flexibility and will use this to win deals. Winning deals has long-tail implications: more power over the supply chain, lower long-term costs, and a wider customer base. Losing deals has the same implications, just in the other direction.
Boeing offers the MAX10 as its A321neo competitor. Ryanair has expressed interest but won’t accept Boeing’s asking price. Several airlines placed orders for the MAX10: United (250), Delta (100), VietJet (80), Alaska (50), flydubai (50), and WestJet (42).
The ongoing pilot shortage makes larger single-aisle aircraft critical to airline operations. To move the recovering traffic, typical 160-seaters are less efficient than ~200-seaters. The added capabilities of the larger models like A321neo and MAX10 make them highly desirable.
But the MAX10, despite its orders from big-name customers, lags the A321neo. The following table lists orders for Airbus and Boeing single aisles focusing on MoM. 
The apparent lead at Boeing is due to their listing any MAX model as MAX rather than the actual derivative. The following chart illustrates what was delivered based on our delivery tracker.
Our delivery tracker shows MAX deliveries have been ~90% MAX8. Among the undefined MAX orders, we estimate ~75% are MAX8s. Of the undefined 5,969, that suggests ~1,500 MAXs that fit into the MoM segment. That guides to an order book of ~1,700 (rounding up) MoM-compliant MAXs. Compare this to Airbus 3,171 MoM orders.
Could undefined MAX orders be converted? Certainly, as we have seen Southwest convert MAX7s to MAX8s. We have suggested that MAX10s orders might convert to MAX9s if Boeing follows through with its threat to cancel the MAX10 program.
Having laid out the numbers, we are left with some questions:
- How did we get here?
- Boeing believed the NG and the MAX could fill the “757-gap” – it didn’t
- Airbus kept improving the A321
- What does Airbus ~2X delivery advantage mean?
- Airbus charges a premium, while Boeing discounts to offset economic differences
- Long-term Airbus builds cashflow and Boeing doesn’t
- Looking forward, what happens next?
- Airbus has funds supporting R&D to keep refining the A321 and develop its replacement
- Boeing is betting on a Black Swan (“there’ll be a moment in time where we’ll pull the rabbit out of the hat and introduce a new airplane sometime in the middle of next decade”)
- The market is going to keep favoring the A321
Richard Aboulafia shared this view: “The possibility of disruptive new technologies has provided a useful excuse for Boeing to do nothing. There may be new propulsion technologies coming in 15 years. Or 20. Nobody can say. In the meantime, the middle market is the hottest segment the industry has seen in decades. And it now belongs to Airbus. All that remains is for Airbus to develop the A220-500, gravely damaging MAX8 sales. That will knock Boeing down to a 25% market share. And being reduced to a 25% market share is the best excuse ever for continuing to do nothing. “
Conclusion
Boeing is disadvantaged in an increasingly important segment, which impacts its product line. Airbus can exploit its A321 advantage across its product line. While Boeing faces long-tail risks, Airbus is likely to become stronger.
Views: 17
I think Airbus has some additional development options. Recent history proves they don’t need Boeing’s competitive pressure to launch new aircraft (A380, NEO, XLR, RACER, MRTT, A400M), just demand & long-term strategy. https://rb.gy/yyw4ae
Airbus has continuously approved the A321, but Boeing can’t or won’t continuously improve their aircraft?! Asinine, myopic, and a hit piece that can easily be countered at almost every point made!
There is only one explanation for Calhoun’s posture: Boeing is running out of cash and its financial position might actually be worse than otherwise indicated, thanks to its creative accounting practices like deferred production costs that does not work so well in times of lower productivity like we are seeing now. They have probably done the adjustment internally but have not yet reported it for as long as it won’t be necessary to do so. Prior to the Max grounding Boeing was doing remarkably well, but since the grounding other calamities started to hit one after the other, like the pandemic and supply chain difficulties for example. Airbus is in a better place despite facing similar challenges and that’s because they don’t have accumulated debts hidden away in program accounting and a large number of grounded aircraft costing almost as much to put back in service as it did to build them in the first place. In other words Boeing is piling up difficulties while Airbus is piling up cash. And what also makes life easier for Airbus right now is that they don’t need a clean-sheet programme while Boeing badly needs one in order to remain competitive. Boeing lost the opportunity to do a clean sheet design, NSA or MOM, when Airbus came up with the NEO. Now it’s too late. It increasingly looks like there will never be a 757 replacement at Boeing, or even a 737 replacement for that matter, for the window of opportunity has now closed.